The present Grounding is, however, intended for nothing more than seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality. (392)

Thus a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of being even worthy of happiness. (393)


A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attained some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself. (394)


Therefore, we shall take up the concept of duty, which includes that of a good will, though with certain certain subjective restrictions and hindrances, which far from hiding a good will or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast to make it shine forth more brightly. On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a duty; and furthermore, everyone has also an immediate inclination to do so. (397)


Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law. (399)


Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it nor in any principle of action that needs to b0rrow its motive from the expected effect. (401)


Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; unfortunately it does not keep very well and it is easily led astray. (405)