Weakness of Will

Conclusion: An incontinent man does immoral or reprehensible acts even though he knows they are immoral or reprehensible because his instinctive appetite overwhelms his rational knowledge at a particular time.(Bk.VII pg.102-104)

Premises

       I.            It is possible to have knowledge and not have it at the same time( Bk.VII pg.103)

               A.            Although a man may recite what he has newly learned, it does not mean he fully understands it for that takes time.

               B.            Other examples of knowledge that can’t be put to use are that of sleeping , drunk or a man of strong feeling (Bk.VII pg.103)

    II.            General knowledge and particular knowledge can be at conflict with one another in a given situation.

A.   Beliefs about particulars are controlled by perception.

1.     It is easy for a man to draw a conclusion from his perceptual knowledge and this belief will cause him to act incontinently. (Bk.VII pg.104).

2.     For a man can look to human nature as to why he acts incontinently (Bk.VII pg.103).

B.   Appetite will favor the particular over the general( Bk. VIIpg.104)

1.     A man’s appetite for sweet things can overcome his universal belief that he should not have sweet things.

2.     When a man chooses to be taken over by his particular he is going against his knowledge. 

 III.            No human being fully knows that  something will harm them and still does it.(implicit)

A.   People who are confident about what they believe are not much different than people who are confident in what they know.

B.    It is inferred of two ways of knowing.

1.      There is a person who has knowledge and uses it

2.     There is a person who has knowledge and does not use it. 

IV.            Ways an incontinent man restore his knowledge.

A.   Similar for a drunk man to restore his knowledge he must become sober , the incontinent man must do the same( Bk.VII pg. 104)

1.     For if the incontinent man has any knowledge it is not because he knows, but because he is simply saying he knows, as he speaks in the tone of a drunken man (Bk.VII pg. 104).

B.   Knowing the difference between being wholly knowledgeable and emotionally (perceptual) knowledgeable is important.

                             1.            Incontinence causes a man to act on perceptual knowledge rather that rational knowledge.

                             2.            There is the case of know something and not knowing something as for how it is possible for a man to have knowledge and still behave as if he has no knowledge or incontinently(Bk.VII pg.104). 

   V.            Rational knowledge is truer than perceptual knowledge (implicit).

Temperance's asymmetrical mean

Conclusion:  Temperance describes a virtuous mean between excesses and deficiencies of pleasures, but a mean closer to excesses than to deficiencies.

1.      Temperance is the mean between indulging and restraining from pleasure. (Book III: 10 pg. 45)

a.       Overindulgence in bodily pleasure is considered intemperate as well as the pain felt from restraining.

2.      Abstaining from pleasure does not constitute temperance (Book III: 11 pg. 47)

a.       A temperate person feels no pain towards abstaining from overindulging in pleasure.

b.      We are considered brave for withstanding the passions although it causes pain to do so.

3.      Absences of pleasure is not the deficient but insensibility (Book III: 11;7)

a.       Insensibility being the inability to feel pleasure or the lack of awareness to what acts are pleasing

b.      Pleasures are natural part of human life one cannot abstain from all pleasure.

c.       There is usually a preference to taste of food and drink and sexual partner.

4.      Only when practicing moderation is this virtue achieved. (Book III: 11; 8)

a.       The constant practice grows into learned behavior habit develops and then the activity becomes the norm. If one learns and constantly practice pleasure in moderation temperance behavior is established. If the characteristic is consistent throughout life temperance is refined.

b.      Actions adept in moderation preserve the character from developing habits of intemperance.

c.       Vicious or licentious habits can cause unfavorable confines towards reaching a virtuous character.

5.      A temperate person is not overwhelmed with restraint

a.       Pleasure partaking occur in the right amount, at the right time for the right reason  

b.      Only the pleasure occurring from satisfying vital need is accepted

6.      Deeds that are perceived poorly by peers are judged accordingly.

7.      Self-indulgence it does not affect the whole body but parts. Pleasures of the soul are not considered temperate or intemperate. (Book III: 10; 2)

a.       Indulging in Arts are not considered excess

8.      Pleasures must be correctly balanced per individual need and aimed towards happiness (absolute end). (Book: III 12; 8-9)

a.       The amount of excess or deficiency is not collective but exclusive to each individual vital needs and unique preference.

9.      Our habits ultimately dictate weather we are considered temperate or intemperate.

a.       Uncontrolled desires towards bodily pleasure increases the desire for the pleasure

                                                                            i.      Indulging just for the sake of indulgence breeds a deeper desire.

                                                                          ii.      Practicing moderation constructs a temperate characteristic.

10.   Achieving a temperate character maintains the harmony of the body and rational soul.

a.       Only when all virtues are expressed can one be viewed as achieving happiness.

Natural virtue perfected un-naturally

Conclusion: We are primed by nature to receive virtues that are then perfected by

    habit. (Chap 1; 1103a:25-26)

Premises:

I.  Virtues cannot come from nature alone. (Chap 1; 1103a:19-20)

    A. That which exists by nature cannot form a habit contrary to this nature. (Chap 1;

        1103a:20-21)

         1. Flame rises and cannot be trained to burn downward. (Chap1; 1103a:23-24)

         2. Animals by nature act according to their desires and do not reason why nor

            consider acting contrary to this nature. (implicit)

    B.  Man by nature has desires and senses but man by nature differs from other living

          things in having the capacity to reason. (Book 1; chap.7; 1098a:3-9)

          1. Man has the ability to reason, therefore can receive virtue and thus allows him

              to adapt his nature toward the pursuit of virtuous action. (Chap 1;1103a:15-18)

          2. Through right thinking and habitation, man can develop the virtues he

                receives. (Chap 1; 1103b.:20-23/ Chap2; 1104a:34-1104b:4)

II. Virtues are produced and destroyed by the same sources and causes. (Chap1;

       1103b:8/Chap 2; 1104a: 28-29)

    A. All men are not born good or bad. (implicit)

         1. Man has to learn virtue and art by the act of doing. (Chap 1; 1103a:27-32/

             1103a:33-1103b:2/1103b:11-17)

             a. The manner in which a person builds will determine whether they are a good

                 or bad builder. (Chap. 1; 1103b:11-12)

             b. The manner in which a person responds in the presence of danger will

                 determine whether they are cowardly or brave. (Chap 1; 1103b:15-16)

         2. There is a need for teachers to aid the learning process and once learned,

             virtues are perfected by habitation. (Chap 1; 1103b:12-13)

   B. Actions shape the development of character. (Chap 4;1105b:10-13)

         1. Appropriate behavior produces virtuous action. (Chap1; 1103b:14-22)

         2. Inappropriate behavior produces undesirable action. (Chap1; 1103b:14- 22)

    C. States of character arise out of like activities. (Chap4; 1105a:29-35)

         1. The activities must be of a certain kind. (Chap 2; 1104a:13-1104b:4)

              a. A self-indulgent person will indulge in all pleasures, a boorish person will

                  abstain from all pleasures. (Chap2; 1104a:23-26)

              b. A person who shuns excess and inappropriate pleasures but engages in

                  some pleasures that are of appropriate nature, develops temperance.

                  (implicit)

         2. States of character correspond to the differences between these. (Chap. 2;

              1104a: 28-31)

              a. A person habituated to stand their ground against injustice will become

                   brave. (Chap. 2; 1104b:2-3)

               b. In having perfected the virtue of bravery, a person will respond to injustice  

                   by standing against it. (Chap. 2; 1104b:3-4) 

III. The type of habits when form from our youth is important. (Chap 1; 1103b:23-25)

     A. Virtues and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. (Chap 3; 1104b:30-34)

     B. The pleasure or pain derived from virtuous action is a sign of state of

              character. (Chap. 3; 1104b:5-9)

     C. Right education leads a person towards virtue and away from vice. (implicit)

           a. Virtue is found in the mean between vices of excess and inaction. (Chap. 6;

                1106b:30-35/ Chap 8;1108b:1-2)

           b. We must be educated and habituated to avoid vice in spite of the pleasure it

                provides and not be pained by this avoidance. (Chap. 9;1109a:25/ Chap 3;

                1104b:11-13)

James Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia"

Summary:

The distinction between active vs. passive euthanasia is essentially "to kill or let die."

(Example: the direct action to kill a terminally ill patient as a form of 'mercy killing' or to

merely withhold treatment)
Conventional doctrine (exemplified by the AMA doctrine) -- active euthanasia is always

forbidden.

AMA Doctrine:

1. Mercy killing ("the intentional termination of life of one human being by another") is wrong.
2. The patient and immediate family decide on withholding treatment if and only if there is "irrefutable evidence" of imminent death.

Rachels argues that:

1. Active is often more humane than passive. (Once the decision to not prolong agony is made, active euthanasia is preferable to passive. Namely, in the relevant case, passive would surely lead to an unnecessary period of prolonged suffering. Recall the dire cancer patient and the Down's baby.)
2. The doctrine leads to decisions concerning life and death on irrelevant grounds. (The "excuse" to kill the Down's baby.)
3. The doctrine rests on a distinction between killing and letting die that itself has no moral importance. (Greed to kill or let die your six-year-old cousin.)
4. The most common argument in favor of the doctrine is invalid.

Arguments:

Rachels attempts to use examples to support his points:

1. Active euthanasia is often more humane than passive.
1. Case 1.1: Patient is dying of incurable cancer, in terrible unalleivable pain, subject to irrefutable imminent death.
1. Because of the last clause, the patient and his immediate family has decided to end it.
2. If the doctor withholds treatment (a la the doctrine) he would justify the action by noting that the patient would die anyway, and it is wrong to prolong suffering needlessly.
3. But, if one simply withholds treatment, the patient may take longer to die, would thus suffer more, relative to the case of active euthanasia, i.e., lethal injection.
4. Thus: once the decision to not prolong agony is made, active euthanasia is preferable to passive.
5. (Otherwise, the patient would suffer more, which is contrary to the "humanitarian impulse" that prompts the decision to end.)
2. Case 1.2: A Down's Syndrome infant suffers a malady (ex: intestinal blockage) that requires operation in order to live.
1. Suppose his parents and the doctor decide not to operate, to let die.
2. The baby would suffer dehydration and infection before dying.
3. It would be cruel if the baby were not given a lethal injection (since its terminal fate is death).
2. The doctrine leads to decisions concerning life and death on irrelevant grounds. 
1. a. Case 2.1: A Down's Syndrome infant needs a medically-doable operation (intestinal operation) unrelated to the Syndrome in order to live.
1. The operation is not done because the child has Down's Syndrome, and thus it is better for the child to die.
2. It is Down's Syndrome that is the defining grounds for death, not the operation.
3. The presence of the intestinal blockage merely serves as the "excuse" for letting die. Since, if that's not the case, "nothing can be done, for one must not 'kill' it"
3. Is killing worse than letting die?
1. Cases: In both cases, the perpetrator stands to gain, perhaps through a large inheritance, if his 6-year old cousin were to die.
1. Case 3.1: The perpetrator Smith purposefully drowns his cousin.
2. Case 3.2: The perpetrator Jones plans to drown his cousin, but his cousin dies in an accident (which he did not cause), which Jones witnesses in full sight. Jones has the power to save his cousin, but he merely stands by and does nothing! Jones argues, "I didn't kill him; I only let him die."
3. If letting die is less bad than killing, this "defense" is actually somewhat valid --however, such a "defense" can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral reasoning. Thus, no defense at all.
4. Therefore: the bare difference between killing and letting die does not, in itself, make a moral difference.
4. The most common arguments for the document are invalid.
1. AMA identifies "intentional termination of life of one human being by another - mercy killing" to be forbidden, but it does not deny the cessation of treatment as intentional termination!
2. People find killing worse than letting die because the media often portrays killing as terrible, essentially, the acts of murderous criminals with petty motives of robbery, perhaps, while "letting die" is a role played by doctors for humanitarian reasons.
1. Both acts involve killing, thus: Killing, itself, is not what makes it worse than letting die, but the motives of the killer versus the "let-killer."
3. Death is regarded as a great evil, thus it is bad to be a causer of death.
1. Active -- directly causes death
2. Passive -- does nothing. Patient dies from illness.
3. But, if a doctor lets a patient with a curable illness die, he would be the cause of death.
4. But, if euthanasia is decided upon for a case, "it has already been decided that in this instance death is no greater evil than the patient's continued existence."
5. The cause of death is, in effect, as evil as the cause of life.
5. Conclusion: the AMA should not give the distinction of active versus passive euthanasia any added authority and weight by writing it into official statements of medical ethics.

This summary came from the following site: http://phil163.auzen.com/yloader.php?title=rachels